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Abstract 
Purpose-The study complements the scant macroeconomic literature on the development 
outcomes of social media by examining the relationship between Facebook penetration and 
violent crime levels in a cross-section of 148 countries for the year 2012.  
 
Design/methodology/approach-The empirical evidence is based on Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), Tobit and Quantile regressions. In order to respond to policy concerns on the limited 
evidence on the consequences of social media in developing countries, the dataset is 
disaggregated into regions and income levels. The decomposition by income levels included: 
low income, lower middle income, upper middle income and high income. The corresponding 
regions include: Europe and Central Asia, East Asia and the Pacific, Middle East and North 
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. 
 
Findings-From OLS and Tobit regressions, there is a negative relationship between Facebook 
penetration and crime. However, Quantile regressions reveal that the established negative 
relationship is noticeable exclusively in the 90th crime quantile. Further, when the dataset is 
decomposed into regions and income levels, the negative relationship is evident in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) while a positive relationship is confirmed for sub-Saharan 
Africa. Policy implications are discussed. 
 
 
Originality/value- Studies on the development outcomes of social media are sparse because 
of a lack of reliable macroeconomic data on social media. This study primarily complemented 
five existing studies that have leveraged on a newly available dataset on Facebook.  
 
 
JEL Classification: K42; D83; O30; D74; D83 
Keywords: Crime; Social media; ICT; Global evidence; Social networks 
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1. Introduction  
 In every corner of the earth, there are a growing number of citizens who considerably 
rely on social media for information and discussion. The knowledge gained could either 
moderate their position on some conflicting interests or consolidate their radical standpoint. 
Discussions may be within personal networks as well as individuals without any prior ties 
with whom offline interactions would have been impossible owing to, inter alia: distances 
and asymmetric daily schedules (Barberá, 2015). In the light of the growing relevance of 
social media platforms in everyday corporate and household activities, a recent World Bank 
report on digital dividends has recommended more research on the socio-economic and 
development consequences of social media (World Bank, 2016).   
 In response to above policy concern, the positioning of this study on the relationship 
between social media and crime is motivated by the growing cost of crime and violence on 
the one hand and gaps in the literature, on the other. These two issues are substantiated below 
in this order.  
First, a substantial part of annual global wealth is increasingly being spent by 
governments in the prevention and mitigation of violence, crimes, political-instability with 
consequent externalities (Asongu, 2018; GPI, 2016; Anderson, 2015; Asongu and Kodila-
Tedika, 2017).  According to the attendant policy and scholarly literature, the underlying 
annual global wealth spent is about 14.3 trillion USD and represents the combined Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) of the following advanced countries, namely: Brazil, Canada, 
France, Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom (UK). This policy effort can be 
considerably improved with evidential insights into the relationship between social media and 
crime across the world. Unfortunately, the extant macroeconomic contemporary literature on 
this interconnection is rare because of a lack of appropriate data.  
 Second, the existing literature on crimes can be summarized in two main strands, 
notably:  (i) studies on crime and (ii) literature on the relationship between social media and 
crime. The former strand has largely focused on: risk evaluations in decisions on sentencing 
(Kopkin et al., 2017);assessment of parallels between mass incarceration and mass 
deportation (Tanya, 2017); determinants of drug use after sentencing (Rao et al., 2016); the 
relevance of legal origins in cross-country consequences of crime (D’Amico and Williamson, 
2015); the role of restorative justice in crime prevention (Wood, 2015); the imprisonment of 
adolescents that are traumatized (Mallet, 2015); drivers and deterrents of juvenile delinquency 
after sentencing (Olashore et al., 2017); the relationship between inequality, imprisonment 
and public health (Wilderman and Wang, 2017) and strategies designed to support families 
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and children whose parents have been imprisoned (Kjellstrand, 2017). The strand of literature 
on the association between social media and crime has focused on: developing social media-
based suicide prevention messages(Robinson et al., 2017); the use of Twitter to monitor 
mental health discussions (McClellan et al., 2017); examining suicide risks and emotional 
distress in Chinese social media (Chen et al., 2017); social media and the emerging suicide 
death rate among military personnel (Bryan et al., 2018) and the designing of microblog 
direct messages used in the engagement of users of social media who have suicide intentions 
(Tan et al., 2017).  
Noticeably, the foregoing literature has the shortcoming of being too exploratory and country-
specific. For instance, the study by Robinson et al. (2017), Tan et al. (2017) and Chen et al. 
(2017) were focused on China while, Bryan et al. (2018) was concerned with the United 
States of America. The present study addresses this country-specific shortcoming by 
employing a global dataset of 148 countries on the one hand and on the other, decomposing 
the dataset into regions and income levels, in order to increase the policy relevance of the 
study. The disaggregation is also motivated by the imperative of articulating developing 
countries, in order to address a concern by the World Bank which maintains that the 
development consequences of social media, especially in developing countries have not been 
substantially researched and documented (World Bank, 2016)1.  
In the light of the observation of the World Bank, a reason for the scant empirical 
analyses on the macroeconomic consequences of social media is the lack of relevant data. As 
far as we have reviewed, only five studies have employed a recent Facebook penetration 
dataset to assess the association between social media usage and development outcomes.  
Kodila-Tedika (2018) has investigated the link between Facebook penetration and the 
governance of natural resources, Jha and Sarangi (2017) have examined if Facebook 
penetration influences corrupt behavior while Jha and Kodila-Tedika (2018) have investigated 
if democracy is promoted by Facebook penetration. Asongu and Odhiambo (2019a, 2019b) 
have assesses nexuses  between social media, tourism and governance. 
The current study improves this strand of literature by evaluating the strength of the 
connection between Facebook penetration and crime. The empirical evidence is based on 
                                                          
1The positioning and design of this paper is consistent with the extant recent empirical and theoretical studies on 
the relevance of information technology in: (i) enhancing conditions for human development (Afutu-Kotey et al., 
2017; Bongomin et al., 2018 ; Asongu and Boateng, 2018; Gosavi, 2018; Hubani and Wiese, 2018; Minkoua 
Nzie et al., 2018; Isszhaku et al., 2018; Abor et al., 2018; Muthinja and Chipeta, 2018; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 
2018a, 2018b)and improving  society with opportunities for human emancipation (Kreps and Kimppa, 2015; 
Tatnall, 2015; Lennerfors et al., 2015; Patrignani and Whitehouse, 2015; Aricat, 2015; Lahtiranta et al., 2015; 
Tchamyou, 2017, 2018; Tchamyou and Asongu, 2017). 
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Tobit and Quantile regressions and data from 148 countries 
for the year 2012.  From OLS and Tobit regressions, there is a negative relationship between 
Facebook penetration and crime. From Quantile regressions, the established negative 
relationship is apparent exclusively in the 90th quantile. When the dataset is decomposed into 
regions and income levels, the negative relationship is obvious in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) while a positive relationship is established for sub-Saharan Africa. 
The results of our empirical analyses have significantly improved the narratives in the 
aforementioned exploratory and country-specific studies in three key ways. First, they 
complemented the description by Tan et al. (2017) and other country-specific studies by 
confirming the policy relevance of the negative association between social media and crime. 
This global dimension can lead to the adoption of more holistic policies that are applicable to 
a wide variety of countries. Second, the findings improve exploratory studies (e.g. Robinson 
et al., 2017) by establishing that the hypothetical negative relationship between social media 
and crime withstands empirical scrutiny within the framework of Facebook penetration. 
Third, contrary to the previous studies, our findings do not support a “one size fits all 
implications for policy” because they are articulated along two main dynamics: on the one 
hand, income levels and regions and on the other hand, initial levels of crime. Accordingly, 
beyond the emphasis on income levels and regions, the fact that the estimated negative 
relationship is exclusively apparent at the highest quantile of the crime distribution is an 
indication that blanket policies on the nexus between Facebook penetration and crime cannot 
be effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of crime and tailored differently across 
countries with low, intermediate and high initial levels of crime.  
Overall, the findings are broadly consistent with the existing literature. According to 
Chen et al. (2017), social media can be used to effectively assess emotional distress and 
suicide risk. Robinson et al. (2017) concluded that social media could potentially be an 
important mechanism for the prevention and moderation of distress as well as suicidal 
behavior and thoughts. This is consistent with the position of Bryan et al. (2018) who 
subsequently found that certain sequences in the content of social media could predict the 
cause and timeline of death by suicide.  The conclusions of Bryan et al. (2018) are in line with 
Tan et al. (2017) who reported that whereas web-based interventions can be effective in the 
prevention of online suicide, it is also imperative to increase user engagement with online 
information and discussion groups.  
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The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 dwells on the theoretical 
underpinning whereas the data and methodology are covered in Section 3. The empirical 
results are presented in Section 4 while Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Theoretical underpinnings  
 The theoretical connection between social media and crime can be elucidated from 
three main perspectives, notably: (i) a Wound Culture Theory (WCT) if Facebook penetration 
positively affects crime; (ii) social control and conflict management theories in a scenario 
where Facebook penetration reduces crime and (iii) irrespective of the direction of effect (i.e. 
whether positive or negative), both strands of theoretical underpinnings rely on technology 
acceptance models. The three theoretical frameworks are expanded in chronological order.  
 The WCT can be used to elicit some negative socio-economic signals such as crimes, 
political instability and violence. The WCT was developed by Mark Seltzer (1998) and later 
summarised by Gibson (2006) as follows:  
“Serial killing has its place in a public culture in which addictive violence has become not 
merely a collective spectacle but one of the crucial sites where private desire and public 
fantasy cross. The convening of the public around scenes of violence–the rushing to the scene 
of the accident, the milling around the point of impact–has come to make up a wound culture; 
the public fascination with torn and open bodies and torn and open persons, a collective 
gathering around shock, trauma, and the wound” (p.19).  
 According to the WCT, the desire to inflict harm on humans in society is both literal 
(via mutilation) and figuration (via criticism). The relevance of crime is considered within the 
theoretical framework as a common focus which enables citizens to engage in wound 
appreciation: “One discovers again and again the excitations in the opening of private and 
bodily and psychic interiors; the exhibition and witnessing, the endlessly reproducible 
display, of wounded bodies and wounded minds in public. In wound culture, the very notion of 
sociality is bound to the excitations of the torn and open body, the torn and exposed 
individual, as public spectacle” (Seltzer, p. 137). The author has further observed that the 
wound theory has considerable implications in the formation of citizenry attitude: “The 
spectacular public representation of violated bodies, across a range of official, academic, and 
media accounts, in fiction and in film, has come to function as a way of imagining and 
situating our notions of public, social, and collective identity (Seltzer, p.21)”. Social media 
can be used to fuel the wound culture because it is a mechanism by which information is 
exchanged to either increase contention or hatred among users or improve harmony and 
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moderation among them. In the latter scenario, conflict management and social control 
models are more relevant. 
 Social control and conflict management models have been used to substantiate 
theoretical underpinnings in recent conflict management literature (Asongu and Kodila-
Tedika, 2017), namely: the Conflict Management Model (CMM) of Thomas-Kilman (1992) 
and the Social Control Theory (SCT) Black (1990). The SCT maintains that relationships 
between organisations, groups and individuals typically affect the exercise of one among five 
fundamental channels of social control, notably: self-help, settlement, avoidance, tolerance 
and negotiation. Conversely, the CMM argues that strategic ambitions that are very likely to 
centre on a two dimensional matrix (of cooperation and assertiveness), when merged with 
collaboration could result in five principal styles in the management of conflicts, namely: 
avoidance, compromise, collaboration, competition and accommodation. These theoretical 
insights are broadly in line with the conflict management literature (Borg, 1992; Volkema and 
Bergmann, 1995; Akinwale, 2010; Asongu and Kodila-Tedika, 2017).Social media provides 
the platforms which underpin the conflict management and social control theories herein 
discussed.  
 The effectiveness of either the WCT or social control theories depends on technology 
acceptance models. In accordance with recent social media (Nikiforova, 2013; Lee and 
Lowry, 2015;Cusick, 2014) and information technology (Yousafzai et al., 2010;Asongu et al., 
2018a) studies, technology acceptance models are dominated by three principal theories 
which justify the adoption and use of specific types of communication tools. They are: (i) the: 
theory of reasoned action (TRA), (ii) theory of planned behavior (TPB) and (iii) technology 
acceptance model (TAM). 
 Consistent with the TRA, the underpinning hypothesis is that, when the 
acknowledgement of actions come into play, customers display rational features (Fishbein and  
Ajzen, 1975; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Bagozzi, 1982). Given the context of the study, these 
rational traits could motivate new ideas, notably: either to the resolution of conflicts or in the 
perception of crime as a solution to conflicts. The TPB is an extension of the TRA which 
articulates the absence of a difference between customers who are conscious of the 
ramifications of their actions and those that are lacking in this consciousness (Ajzen, 1991). 
The theory is in accordance with social media because crime prevention or crime propagation 
can be done by users with or without, adequate certainty on the soundness of the information 
being shared. Concerning the TAM, the principal driver behind a customer’s motivation to 
adopt a specific technology is traceable to preferences and the will of a client to adopt and use 
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a specific means of communication (Davis, 1989).  Hence, the selection of social media 
platform by a user is contingent on the relevance of the social media network in attenuating or 
fuelling crime.  
 The three strands of theories, which were discussed in the previous paragraphs, are 
also relevant to the positioning of this study because:  (i) Facebook penetration entails the 
adoption and usage of a specific type of social media (which is consistent with technology 
acceptance models) and (ii) Facebook can either be used to fuel or deter crime. On the one 
hand, the use of Facebook to fuel crime is consistent with Wound Culture Theory while the 
use of the Facebook to mitigate crime is in line with the Social Control Theory and the 
Conflict Management Model. On the other, the common features among technology 
acceptance models merit contextualisation. Accordingly, the TRA, TPB and TAM articulate 
the perspective that the use and adoption of particular types of communication mechanisms 
encompass a multitude of traits, namely: (i) the formation of customer belief and (ii) the 
composite elements which entail, utilitarian, behavioural, psychological and social 
characteristics.  In what follows, these common features are contextualised. 
 Within the specific context of this study; (i) the utilitarian view is apparent when a 
social media platform is adopted by an individual because he/she presumes that such a 
platform is relevant in enhancing his/her opportunities for fuelling or preventing crime; (ii) 
with regard to the behavioural view, even in a scenario where personal motivation is not 
apparent, an individual can still take the decision to use social media if he/she already has 
some degree of awareness that adopting social media for crime-related purposes is a social 
norm; (iii) psychological and personal motivations can also be important in the decision of an 
individual to adopt a social media platform for crime-related concerns if the person is 
motivated by private  potential rewards in crime prevention and/or crime instigation by means 
of social media and (iv) the importance of belief formation in a individual is consolidated by 
the view that it is an accepted social norm that social media can either be used to prevent 
crime or instrumented to fuel crime.  
 In the light of the above concepts, the decision by an individual to adopt Facebook for 
a crime-related ambition can be inspired by both idiosyncratic (or individual) and systemic (or 
social) factors as well as the potential advantages of using the social media platform to realise 
his/her crime-related objective.  
The choice of variables in the conditioning information set is consistent with wound 
culture (i.e. for the Would Culture Theory), conflict management (i.e. for the Conflict 
Management Model) and social control (i.e. for the Social Control Theory). These control 
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variables which are discussed in the data section include: (i) access to weapons, (ii) homicide 
rate, (iii) prison incarcerations, (iv) violent demonstrations and (v) conflict intensity. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data 
 The study focuses on a cross-section of 148 countries for the year 2012. The selected 
geographic and temporal scopes are due to data availability constraints. The data comes from 
variables sources, notably: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths 
Dataset; Qualitative assessments by Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU) analysts’ estimates; the 
Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); the International Institute for Strategic Studies 
(IISS)the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP); the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends, Quintly and the United Nations Committee on 
Contributions. The selection of these sources is motivated by recent literature on crime and 
violence (Asongu and Acha-anyi, 2018; Asongu, 2018). Moreover, to the best of our 
knowledge, the sources are used by authoritative scholarly and policy reports and datasets on 
crime and peace. These include: reports on the global peace index and the global terrorism 
database. 
 The dependent variable is the level of violent crime from the Qualitative assessment 
by the EIU analysts’ estimates while the data on Facebook penetration (which is a proxy of 
social media usage) is from Quintly, which is a social media benchmarking and analytics 
Solution Company2.This data on social media is consistent with recent literature on the 
consequences of social media on development outcomes (Jha and Sarangi, 2017; Jha and 
Kodila-Tedika, 2018; Kodila-Tedika, 2018; Asongu and Odhiambo, 2019a, 2019b). Such 
confirms the authenticity of our source of data on Facebook penetration. However, as in the 
case of these other previous studies, the findings are interpreted as simple correlations without 
causal inferences. This is due to, the cross sectional nature of the dataset. This caveat is also 
disclosed in the concluding section. In summary, in the absence of panel data, the use of 
cross-sectional data to inform scholars and policy makers on the relationships between a new 
phenomenon (such as social media penetration) and social outcomes (such as crime), is a 
useful initial scientific activity. 
 Five main control variables are adopted in this study. They are: (i) access to weapons; 
(ii) homicide; (iii) incarcerations; (iv) violent demonstrations and (v) conflict intensity. The 
selection of the variables to be included in the conditioning information set is supported by 
                                                          
2
 The data was accessed from its website (http://www.quintly.com/facebook-countrystatistics?period=1year ). 
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the findings of recent studies on the determinants of conflicts, crime, incarcerations and 
violence (Asongu and Acha-anyi, 2018;Asongu and Kodila-Tedika, 2016, 2017; GPI, 
2016;Freytag et al., 2011; Blanco and Grier, 2009). They commonly advised that variables 
which are most likely to be associated with crime (as documented in the attendant literature) 
should be used as control variables. In accordance with the existing literature, we expect these 
variables to positively influence the crime rate. This is essentially because they reflect 
conditions that are favorable to criminality and violence. The choice of these control variables 
is also consistent with the aforementioned theories because they are by definition concomitant 
with wound culture, conflict management and social control. Appendix 1 provides the 
definitions of variables while Appendix 2 discloses the summary statistics (in Panel A) and 
the sampled countries (in Panel B). A correlation matrix is also provided in Appendix 3.  
Secondary data is used for the study. Hence, contrary to the requirement of discussing 
how the data is collected as it is the case of primary data, the study defines the variables, 
justifies the reliability of their sources and articulates how the choice of the variables are in 
conformity with existing literature and the problem statement being investigated. The 
interested reader is advised to obtain further information on how data on each variable was 
collected by referring to the original sources identified in the previous paragraph 
 
3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares  
 
Borrowing from recent literature based on cross-sectional observations, the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimation strategy is considered because the underlying assumptions are in 
agreement with the nature of the dataset. The latest articles have advised the use of this 
estimation approach on cross-sectional data (Andrés, 2006; Asongu, 2013a; Kodila-Tedika 
and Asongu, 2015). The following equation illustrates the relationship between Facebook 
penetration and crime.  
 
iiii XFC   321 ,                               (1) 
where iC  and iF
 
represents the crime and Facebook penetration indicator for country i in that 
order, 1 is a constant, X  is a vector of control variables, and i  the error term. X contains the 
following five variables: (i) access to weapons; (ii) homicide; (iii) incarcerations; (iv) violent 
demonstrations and (v) conflict intensity. 
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3.2.2 Tobit regressions 
 The level of violent crime as rated by the EIU analysts’ varies from 0 to 5. 
Theoretically, the OLS approach could be complemented with Tobit regressions because the 
dependent variable has a restricted range (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000; Koetter et al., 2008; 
Ariss, 2010; Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2010). Moreover, a double-censored Tobit approach is 
the same as estimating with a linear regression technique because the two likelihood functions 
coincide (Coccorese and Pellecchia, 2010; Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2016; Ajide et al., 
2018).  
The standard Tobit model (Tobin, 1958; Carsun and Sun, 2007) is represented as 
follows: 
tititi Xy ,,0
*
,
 
 ,                                                 (2) 
 
where *
,tiy is a latent response variable, tiX , is an observed k1 vector of explanatory variables 
and ti, i.i.d. N(0, σ2) and is independent of the tiX , variables. Instead of observing *,tiy , we 
observe tiy , :   
,,0 *
,
*
,
*
,,
, 





ti
titi
ti y
y
if
ify
y                                                      (3) 
 
where is a non-stochastic constant. In other words, the value of *
,tiy is missing when it is less 
than or equal to   . 
 
3.2.3Quantile Regressions  
 The OLS and Tobit regressions discussed in the previous two sections are based on the 
conditional mean of the dependent variable. In order to address this static concern, the 
Quantile regression approach is adopted to estimate parameters throughout the conditional 
distribution of the dependent variable (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). While mean effects in the 
previous two estimation techniques are relevant, the Quantile regression technique articulates 
lower, intermediate and higher levels of crime. The Quantile regression strategy is 
increasingly being employed in the empirical literature in order to provide more policy 
implications. Most notable studies are in: health (Asongu, 2014a), finance, (Asongu, 2014b) 
and corruption (Billger and Goel, 2009; Asongu, 2013b; Okada and Samreth, 2012).   
The  th quantile estimator of crime is obtained by solving for the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts in Eq. (4) for the purpose of 
simplicity and readability.   
12 
 
    

  
 



 


ii
i
ii
i
k
xyii
i
xyii
i
R
xyxy
::
)1(min
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where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS method which is fundamentally based on minimizing the 
sum of squared residuals, the  QR approach focuses on minimising the weighted sum of 
absolute deviations for different quantiles such as the 50th quantile or 90th quantile (with 
=0.50 or 0.90 respectively). The conditional quantile of the crime rate or iy given ix is shown 
as: 
 
 iiy xxQ )/(   ,                                                                                                        (5) 
where, unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are assessed only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of the crime rate. For Eq. (5) the dependent variable iy  is 
crime whereas ix is a vector contain in the following control variables: a constant term, access 
to weapons; homicide; incarcerations; violent demonstrations and conflict intensity 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Presentation of results  
The empirical results pertaining to OLS and Tobit regressions are presented in Table 1. 
Findings reported on the left-hand side (LHS) and right-hand side (RHS) are respectively 
from OLS and Tobit regressions. The following outcomes are observable from the table. 
First, Facebook penetration is negatively correlated with the crime rate. The negative 
relationship is robust to the first-three specifications on the LHS and the first-two 
specifications on the RHS. It is important to note that the best specification is the third 
because concerns of multicollinearity are less noticeable. Putting aside the concern of 
multicollinearity, univariate regressions depict a negative correlation between the two 
variables of interest.  However, the magnitude of negative relationship decreases as the 
number of variables in the conditioning information set is increased. This change is normal 
because in the real world, Facebook penetration and crime do not interact in isolation, but the 
connection is contingent on other determinants of crime. Moreover, as more control variables 
are added to the specifications, the coefficient of adjustment (i.e., adjusted R-squared) 
increases. The significant determinants of crime (or control variables) in the conditioning 
information set have the expected positive signs.  
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Table 1: Ordinary Least Squares and Negative Binomial regressions  
         
 Dependent variable: Crime 
 Ordinary Least Squares  Tobit  Regressions 
         
Constant  3.322*** 1.176*** 0.860** -0.081 3.426*** 0.858** 0.436 -0.710 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.822) (0.000) (0.026) (0.303) (0.122) 
Facebook Penetration  -0.027*** -0.008** -0.006* 0.0009 -0.033*** -0.010* -0.008 0.0007 
 (0.000) (0.032) (0.087) (0.798) (0.000) (0.056) (0.135) (0.888) 
Access to Weapons --- 0.579*** 0.412*** 0.218*** --- 0.687*** 0.495*** 0.266** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) 
Homicide  --- --- 0.316*** 0.324*** --- --- 0.360*** 0.368*** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Incarcerations  --- --- -0.047   -0.023 --- --- -0.022 0.005 
   (0.559) (0.752)   (0.821) (0.951) 
Violent  Demonstrations  --- --- --- 0.294*** --- --- --- 0.378*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
Conflict Intensity  --- --- --- 0.193** --- --- --- 0.207** 
    (0.010)    (0.023) 
         
         
Fisher  15.36*** 65.84*** 41.01*** 37.20***     
Adjusted R² 0.202 0.419 0.496 0.576     
LR Chi-Square     33.38*** 78.44*** 97.57*** 123.06*** 
Pseudo R²     0.069 0.162 0.202 0.255 
Log Likelihood     -224.597 -202.069 -192.501 -179.757 
         
Observations  148 148 148 148 148 148 148 148 
         
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
 
 
 Table 2 provides the Quantile regressions results which are based on the third 
specification of OLS and Tobit regressions in Table 1. As discussed previously, this third 
specification in Table 1 provides our best Facebook estimator because issues of 
multicollinearity are more apparent in the fourth specification. Consistent differences in the 
estimated Facebook coefficients between the OLS/Tobit and Quantiles regressions (in terms 
of sign, magnitude and significance) provides justification for our decision to employ the 
three separated estimation methods in this study. The main finding in the Quantile regression 
in Table 2 is that, the established negative relationship between Facebook penetration and 
crime is highest in the 90th quantile. Again, the significant control variables display the 
expected signs.  
 
Table 2: Quantile Regressions  
      
 Dependent variables: Crime 
      
 Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
      
Constant  0.614 0.348 0.743 1.428* 1.952*** 
 (0.328) (0.473) (0.100) (0.077) (0.001) 
Facebook Penetration  
-0.008 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.018*** 
 (0.168) (0.533) (0.344) (0.421) (0.003) 
Access to Weapons  0.308*** 0.364*** 0.449*** 0.449** 0.399*** 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.014) (0.001) 
Homicide  0.154* 0.315*** 0.278*** 0.389** 0.356*** 
 (0.066) (0.000) (0.003) (0.018) (0.002) 
Incarcerations  
-0.034 -0.011 -0.029 -0.160 0.023 
 (0.830) (0.914) (0.780) (0.309) (0.819) 
      
Pseudo R2 0.264 0.248 0.293 0.310 0.376 
Observations  148 148 148 148 148 
      
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile 
regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where Crime is least. 
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4.2 Extension with fundamental characteristics  
 
 As an extension of our empirical analysis, a recent concern raised by a World Bank 
report is addressed in this section. This relates to the poor coverage in the literature of the 
importance of social media in development outcomes, especially for developing countries 
(World Bank, 2016). In order to articulate the relevance of our analysis for developing 
nations, the dataset is disaggregated into regions and income levels. This decomposition by 
regions and income groups is in accordance with the World Bank’s classification of income 
groups and a recent stream of development studies (Narayan et al., 2011; Beegle et al., 2016; 
Asongu and Nwachukwu, 2017; Mlachila et al., 2017;Asongu and Le Roux, 2017)3.  The 
decomposition by income levels comprises: low income, lower middle income, upper middle 
income and high income. The corresponding regions include: Europe and Central Asia, East 
Asia and the Pacific, Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America.  
  
Table 3 : Comparative evidence on social media and political instability  
           
 Dependent variable: Crime 
   
 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
   
 Income Levels Regions 
 HI UMI LMI LI ECA EAP MENA SSA LA 
           
Constant  0.513 1.818* 0.938 1.060 0.798* 0.394 0.983 0.472 0.711 
 (0.429) (0.085) (0.304) (0.249) (0.078) (0.780) (0.506) (0.581) (0.686) 
Facebook Penetration  -0.003 0.0008 0.015 0.053 -0.002 0.00008 -0.049*** 0.054*** -0.011 
 (0.421) (0.937) (0.337) (0.549) (0.572) (0.995) (0.001) (0.003) (0.567) 
           
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
Fisher  5.87*** 6.20*** 2.46*** 5.85*** 13.60*** 2.40*** 12.20*** 7.46*** 6.34*** 
Adjusted R² 0.421 0.451 0.231 0.293 0.564 0.469 0.551 0.379 0.391 
Observations  42 34 39 33 47 15 17 38 22 
          
           
 Tobit Regressions 
 Income Levels Regions 
 HI UMI LMI LI ECA EAP MENA SSA LA 
           
Constant  0.061 1.094 0.345 0.493 0.753 -0.314 0.582 -0.336 -1.134 
 (0.931) (0.489) (0.742) (0.671) (0.220) (0.850) (0.740) (0.784) (0.677) 
Facebook Penetration  -0.007 -0.0001 0.017 0.073 -0.005 0.003 -0.065** 0.077** -0.027 
 (0.461) (0.991) (0.433) (0.559) (0.418) (0.863) (0.018) (0.047) (0.415) 
           
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
           
LR Chi-Square 17.47*** 14.69*** 11.04*** 11.60*** 37.10*** 9.48*** 12.94*** 17.92*** 12.12*** 
Pseudo R² 0.158 0.149 0.089 0.122 0.303 0.184 0.233 0.165 0.176 
Log Likelihood -46.563 -41.830 -56.168 -41.455 -42.608 -21.015 -21.245 -45.326 -28.262 
Observations  42 34 39 33 47 15 17 38 22 
           
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. HI: High Income countries. UMI: Upper Middle Income countries. LMI: 
Little Middle Income countries. LI: Low Income countries. ECA: Europe and Central Asia. EAP:  East Asia and the Pacific. MENA: Middle 
East and North Africa. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa.  LA: Latin America.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 There are four main World Bank income groups: (i) high income, $12,276 or more; (ii) upper middle income, 
$3,976-$12,275; (iii) lower middle income, $1,006-$3,975 and (iv) low income, $1,005 or less. 
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4.3 Discussion  
 
 The negative relationship between social media and violent crime can be elucidated 
from two main perspectives: (i) friendly interactions for ideological moderation and (ii) 
ideological harmonisation. These two perceptions are expanded in chronological order.  
 First, a possible reason for the negative association between Facebook penetration and 
crime is because the information sharing platform does not exclusively connect people with 
problems in the society– the kind of disputes that could motivate them to resort to crime as a 
means to resolving them. Hence, diverse information on how to solve corresponding issues 
may provide Facebook users with avenues and solutions to the concerns that otherwise would 
have been resolved through violence and crime.  
 The consumption of conflicting information from social media (Kaplan and Haenlein, 
2010) is not exclusively limited to interactions between acquaintances, co-workers, family 
and friends. This narrative is consistent with the literature maintaining that, selectivity of 
information is restricted because users of social media platforms are exposed to all types of 
information on conflict resolution and crime prevention from friends and acquaintances 
(Brundidge, 2010). As recently explained by Barberá (2015), in accordance with the Pew 
Research Centre, as of 2013, approximately half of the users of social media (i.e. Facebook 
and Twitter), received information from a plethora of sites while about 78% of the underlying 
users were exposed incidentally to information. In summary, a social media platform is a 
mechanism by which friendly interactions and ideological moderation can assuage violent 
intensions. The medium of exchange and moderation has been generally supported by the 
mainstream literature on this channel. Most notably: (i) Burke and Kraut (2014) who 
concluded that there is a considerable overlap between offline and personal networks; (ii) 
Gilbert and Karahalios (2009) and Jones et al., (2013) who remarked that social media 
interactions facilitate the consolidation of interpersonal relationships (iii) Mutz, (2006) who 
asserted that online information sharing platforms promote ties between social media users 
(iv) Messing and Westwood (2014) who suggested that friendly recommendations by social 
media users are indications that reduce conflicting situations and (v) Barberá, (2015) who 
proposed that individuals are more likely to use information from people sharing the same 
social media platform even if they disagree with them. Such diversity in views provides a 
gateway to ideological moderation.   
 Secondly, ideological moderation is facilitated by social media because users of social 
media are exposed to information from people with different ideologies and network 
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heterogeneity (Mutz, 2006; Barberá, 2015). This is contrary to a contending proposition in the 
literature that the exchange of information on social media is often between users of the same 
belief (Conover et al., 2012; Colleoni et al., 2014; Smith et al., 2014; Barberá and Rivero, 
2014). The position supported by findings in this study is that exposure to social media can 
moderate violent dispositions because of among others reasons relating to: “political 
tolerance” (Mutz, 2002), “greater awareness of rationales for oppositional views” (Mutz, 
2002, p.114), a learning framework of socialization (Stoker and Jennings, 2008) and 
mitigation in overconfidence in ideological positions (Iyengar  et al., 2012; Ortoleva and 
Snowberg, 2015). 
  
5. Concluding implications and future research directions 
 
The study has examined the relationship between Facebook penetration and violent crime in a 
cross-section of 148 countries for the year 2012. The empirical evidence is based on three 
estimation methods: (i) Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), (ii) Tobit and (iii) Quantile 
regressions. From OLS and Tobit regressions, there is a negative relationship between 
Facebook penetration and crime. From Quantile regressions, the established negative 
relationship is apparent exclusively in the 90th quantile. When the dataset is disaggregated into 
regions and income levels, the negative relationship is noticeable in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) while a positive relationship is confirmed for sub-Saharan Africa.  
 The findings have also contributed to the policy literature on the concern that the 
literature on the consequences of social media is sparse, especially in developing countries 
(World Bank, 2016). Furthermore, when existing levels of crime are taken into account in the 
modelling exercise, the fact that social media is most effective in countries where the crime 
rate is highest. Such, is an indication that blanket policies on the interconnections between 
Facebook penetration and crime rates are ineffective unless the application is tailored 
distinctly across countries with high, intermediate and low levels of crime.  
The findings of the study also have implications on the social theory literature because 
they complement the existing studies on the importance of social networks in the behaviour of 
citizens (Tufekci and Wilson, 2012; Bond et al., 2012; Vaccari et al., 2013).  As discussed in 
Section 4.3, our findings also clarify the relevance of social media in modulating violent 
tendencies owing to information diversity, ideological moderation and ideological 
harmonisation, when messages are disseminated via social media platforms such as the 
Facebook (McClurg, 2006; Klofstad, 2009; Barbera, 2015). 
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 In the light of the above, it is also worthwhile to emphasise that, with the exception of 
the Sub-Saharan African region, the findings in this study challenge the mainstream wisdom 
that social media fuels violence. The corresponding caveat is that, the established negative 
link between Facebook penetration and crime is not causal. However, in the absence of panel 
data, the use of cross-sectional data to inform scholars and policy makers on the 
interconnections between a new phenomenon (such as social media) and social outcomes 
(such as crime), is a worthwhile initial empirical exercise.  
 In the light of the above shortcomings, improving the findings with panel data in the 
assessment of whether the relationships extend to causality is advisable. Moreover, examining 
the feasibility of the suggested channels of association (i.e. ideological moderation and 
ideological harmonisation) is another interesting future research area.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definition of variables 
  
Variables  Definition of variables and sources  
  
Violent Crime  Level of violent crime 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Facebook Penetration  Facebook penetration (2012), defined as the percentage of total population that 
uses Facebook. From Quintly. 
  
Access to Weapons  Ease of access to small arms and light weapons 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Homicides  Number of homicides per 100,000 people 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates 
  
Incarceration  Number of jailed population per 100,000 people 
World Prison Brief, International Centre for Prison Studies, University of Essex 
  
Violent Demonstrations  Likelihood of violent demonstrations 
Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts 
  
Conflict Intensity  Conflict Intensity, GPI 
  
  
  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).  The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP). The  Economic 
Intelligence Unit (EIU). United Nations Peacekeeping Funding (UNPKF). GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). GPI: Global Peace Index. 
 
Appendix 2: Summary Statistics and presentation of countries  
      
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables  Mean  Standard dev. Minimum Maximum  Obsers 
      
Violent Crime  2.774 1.109 1.000 5.000 148 
      
Facebook Penetration 19.868 18.566 0.038 97.636 148 
      
Access to Weapons 3.118 1.077 1.000 5.000 148 
Homicides  2.799 1.170 1.183 5.000 148 
      
Incarceration  2.209 0.902 1.174 5.000 148 
      
Violent Demonstrations  2.950 0.983 1.000 5.000 148 
      
Conflict Intensity 2.432 1.164 1.000 5.000 148   
      
      
Panel B: Sampled countries (148) 
 
Afghanistan; Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bahrain; 
Bangladesh; Belarus; Belgium; Benin; Bhutan; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Botswana; Brazil; Bulgaria; 
Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cambodia; Cameroon; Canada; Central African Republic; Chad; Chile; China; 
Colombia; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus;  Czech Republic;  Democratic Republic of the Congo; Denmark; 
Djibouti; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Eritrea; Estonia; Ethiopia; 
Finland; France; Gabon; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Guinea; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; 
Hungary; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Iraq; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; 
Kuwait; Kyrgyz Republic; Laos; Latvia; Lebanon; Lesotho; Libya; Lithuania; Macedonia (FYR); Madagascar; 
Malawi; Malaysia; Mali; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Montenegro; Morocco; 
Mozambique; Namibia; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Niger;  Nigeria; Norway; Oman; 
Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea;  Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Qatar; Republic of the 
Congo; Romania; Russia; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Serbia; Sierra Leone; Singapore; Slovakia; Slovenia; 
Somalia; South Africa; South Korea; Spain; Sri Lanka; Swaziland; Sweden; Switzerland; Tajikistan; Tanzania; 
Thailand; The Gambia; Togo; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Turkmenistan; Uganda; Ukraine; United 
Arab Emirates; United Kingdom; United States of America; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen 
and Zambia.. 
      
      
Standard dev: standard deviation. Obsers: Observations.   
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Appendix 3: Correlation  matrix 
        
Weapons  Homicide  Incarcerations  Demonstrations  Conflict Intensity  Facebook  Crime   
1.000 0.527 -0.105 0.525 0.605 -0.545 0.636 Weapons 
 1.000 0.186 0.256 0.337 -0.363 0.578 Homicide 
  1.000 -0.160 -0.071 0.121 -0.028 Incarcerations 
   1.000 0.531 -0.473 0.552 Demonstrations 
    1.000 -0.531 0.563 Conflict Intensity 
     1.000 -0.449 Facebook 
      1.000 Crime 
        
Weapons: Access to weapons. Homicide: Homicide rate. Incarcerations: Incarceration rate. Demonstrations: 
Violent demonstrations. Facebook: Facebook penetration. Crime: Violent crime.  
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